Unless memory fails, never has a Target Article collection published in The American Journal of Bioethics occasioned as much interest as "Crossing Species Boundaries," (Robert and Baylis 2003) . Perhaps Bul nch's Mythology should be revised to take account of the dozens of real, imaginary, or putative creatures put to use in these pages: the essay of Brem and Anijar (2003) alone merits a dozen new pages in Bul nch. Dozens more than we were able to publish wrote to suggest articles, and most had among their merits a proposal to outline what it would "be like" to make chimeras, or why the making of part-human organisms bothers us so much, contrary to Robert and Baylis' entreaties to be more sanguine about such worries. Certainly the words "repugnance" and "yuck" have never been used so many times in a scant fty pages, and it is dif cult for me to imagine a more rigorous or intense interdisciplinary conversation based not on research, but rather on the importance of the emotive: visceral fear, distrust, resentment, and indignation.
There is more to the discussion than feelings, good or bad, about mixing humans and plants or animals. This is a Target Article collection that features Hank Greely's (2003) smart categorization of the ways we might mix ourselves, or plants or animals-a kind of 21st century guide to taxonomy. There is A.M. Chakrabarty's (2003) rumination on the use of the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to prevent patent protection of transhuman hybridization, and David Resnick's (2003) rejection of patents on that which is "humanlike".
But as Paul Thompson (2003) pointedly puts the matter, "only someone whose head has been deep in the sand of medical ethics would be tempted" to hold that the problem of de ning what is permissible in transgenic human engineering for any purpose is either a new problem or one that has been devoid of debate. Thompson is surely right, but what makes this collection so interesting to me is both its emphasis: the incredible and newly-powerful political valence attached to "humanness" by those who oppose its "violation" through genetic engineering; and the language of a new kind of bioethics that harnesses that valence as the very heart and soul of a "neocon" theory of human nature.
It is has become the era of Leon Kass, or more speci cally the era of one argument from one part of Kass' 1980s work on bioethics, brought back to scholarly life by a call from President George W. Bush for Kass to return to bioethics from the philosophy of food, which he had pursued for almost a decade until called upon by The New Republic to revise an old article as a response to the cloning of Dolly the sheep. It was a call for Kass to become a Presidential bioethics advisor, drawing in that role on the service of a Council-one very much the opposite of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission set up by President Clinton. The Council would be, as was detailed by numerous Washington insiders in print exposés of the Council, in the service of putting a stop to embryonic stem cell research, and if possible, putting a stop to a number of other scienti c and clinical projects objectionable to the farright wing of the Republican party, and in particular, Southern Baptists.
The simple, redacted argument of Kass and his handpicked council is dif cult to debate: we ought to pay attention to revulsion when we experience it in re ecting on new scienti c discoveries. Even if his arguments about the importance of revulsion and repugnance are decades old, and derive not from Kass' own body of work so much as the hundred-year-old multidisciplinary work of zoologist Adolf Portmann (1990) , and the twenty-ve-year-old work of philosopher Hans Jonas (1982), they are arguments with traction, as evidenced by the present Target Article collection. Whether the topic is geneticallymodi ed crops that contain human genes or cow-human pre-embryos, the "don't go there if it feels odd" argument -and the equally emotive reply to that argument-are everywhere. The Kass commission, which nally agreed to disagree internally on stem cell research, much to the chagrin of Kass and the President, has given us a new kind of problem: not the problem of divining which method will help bioethics scholars solve a problem, or the problem of bioethics scholars who disagree, or even the problem of how to determine who is or is not really a bioethicist, but rather the problem of bioethicists' feelings as expressed in policy-related statements. If it feels bad, can we not do it?
Leon Kass happens to share the name of a movie assassin. But the metaphor is striking: a new kind of vulnerable creature, the clone or transgenic human, has brought about a sudden change of behavior and argument among those who formerly carried fetuses in jars at abortion clinics, and especially among the more intellectual neoconservatives. Suddenly the art is not of blood war, but of politics as war. Leon the Professional assassin is a dangerous man who is won over by the utter powerlessness of a feral street child who needs Pygmalion-style teaching. He doesn't stop what he is doing, he has an epiphany about how it should be done.
The Bush administration has given us a new kind of anti-abortion language: one couched not in the evils of hell that await abortion doctors but rather in the importance of our shared feeling of "yuck" about those new scienti c experiments that produce creatures whose existence itself would merit such great grievousness as to cause an epiphany in the most cold-blooded scientist. Leon Kass isn't Leon the Professional. But if you follow the metaphor, he is messenger of a new anti-science elite: the more you support weird science, the more conservatives will enlist the compassion of all Americans for the vulnerable, and the less likely you are to make your experiment happen. Never mind that the only people hustling to make human clones are UFO a cionados; the point is that even the stem cell researcher is a threat to human dignity, and that simply cannot be countenanced by the human heart once neoconservative love of unadulterated human nature is allowed to make its way into that heart. These are essays that collectively re ect on what sort of human creation crosses moral lines. In "Transgenic Chimeras" Sagoff (2003) notes that even when pigs are made using some human bits and parts, whether those bits and parts be necessary to human life as we recognize it or merely the otsam and jetsam of humanness; whether those bits and parts be permanent or impermanent; whether those parts be genetic, enzyme, protein, or more a matter of gross morphology. But, as Sagoff also points out, in Homer's Iliad, it is dif cult to piece apart what it is about Chimaera (not lion, not serpent, not goat, not normal, not functional in an ordinary medical sense) that offends: the union that produced the creature, or the hybrid that resulted. For Kass, the answer to this technical question-one that recurs throughout the collection of extraordinarily lucid and imaginative essays assembled in this collection-is not especially important. The important matter is that, as Hans Jonas put it much more succinctly in his own re ections on the engineering of humans, one must get it right the rst time in hybridization that involves humans and animals, because one never knows what sort of thing one will hurt if a mistake is made: the human as understood in "pre-engineering culture." This, for Jonas, is what makes human "self-engineering" unique in all of engineering (1982) . But if we get past the "yuck"-as is suggested by more than half the contributors to the collection-we nd that engineering of humans is not only ubiquitous and a function of ordinary human life as well as high-technology science, but also that the rules for avoiding "yuck" are a mere matter of faith themselves in the articles of a imsy new kind of neoconservative natural law theory. And perhaps we are better off yucky but complicated than in the clean, well-lit spaces of the illusory safety of a "nature" that doesn't really exist, or at least can't be operationalized in science or policy.
